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I. Introduction
Plansforthreeairlinealliancesthatinvolvethesixlargestdomesticcarriers in the United States were announced during the first half of 1998. Continental Airlines and Northwest Airlines announced their intention to create an alliance in January 1998; Delta Airlines/United Airlines and American Airlines/ US Airways followed in April 1998. An alliance allows the alliance partners to sell seats on each other's planes; each carrier can thereby offer additional airline service to potential travelers. For example, an alliance will allow a carrier to offer service on at least some city pairs that it does not fly between, by combining one leg of a flight on one of its planes with a second leg of a flight on which its alliance partner provides service.
The announcement of these alliances generated substantial controversy.
competed more vigorously as a result of the alliance, with the alliance partners gaining share at the expense of their rivals. 3. The NW/AS (Northwest/Alaska) alliance also appears to have generated consumer benefits. We find that average fares fell on city pairs served by the NW/AS alliance, and we find some evidence that total traffic increased on city pairs on which the alliance created new "online" service.
4. Consumer benefits were generated both by the creation of new online carriers on some routes and by allowing one or both of the alliance partners to increase the frequency of service on other routes.
5. The magnitude of the alliance effect depended on the prealliance level of competition, although not on the prealliance level of the alliance partners' share on a city pair.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe how airline alliances are operated and review the procompetitive justifications for, and anticompetitive concerns about, such alliances. In Section III, we describe the Continental/America West and Northwest/Alaska alliances and the variables that we analyze. In Section IV, we discuss our estimates of the competitive effects of these alliances. Section V concludes.
II. Airline Alliances

A. How Airline Alliances Operate
Airline alliances typically involve "code sharing," a practice in which a particular flight will receive the designations of two airlines in the computerized reservation systems (CRSs) used by travel agents.
5 Such a flight receives the code of the airline actually operating the flight-the operating carrier-and the code of that carrier's alliance partner-the marketing carrier. For example, prior to the code-share agreement between Continental and America West, America West (but not Continental) offered service between San Diego and Houston, and this flight was coded HP (America West's twoletter designation) on travel agent CRSs. Once the code-share agreement was in place, the flight between San Diego and Houston also appeared in CRSs with the Continental designation. That is, a single code-share flight appears twice on a CRS-it is listed once as a flight by the operating carrier and once as a flight by the marketing carrier (typically with a different flight number). The code-share flight between San Diego and Houston is designated CO* (as well as HP), where the asterisk indicates that the flight is not operated by the marketing carrier. The use of the asterisk to indicate such flights is mandated by a Department of Transportation (DOT) regulation. 5 Some carriers enter only into "marketing alliances," which typically link frequent-flyer programs and provide travelers access to each other's airport lounges but do not include code sharing. The proposed American/US Airways deal was intended to begin as a marketing alliance, with code sharing to be added later.
Code-share agreements allow a carrier to independently set price and sell service between cities that it otherwise would not be able to serve. For example, prior to the code-share agreement, suppose that Continental offered nonstop service between cities A and B, but not between B and C, and that America West offered nonstop service between cities B and C, but not between A and B. Suppose also that neither carrier offered one-stop service between A and C through a connection point other than B. If America West's B-to-C flight were code shared with Continental, then Continental could offer one-stop service from A to C. That is, Continental could quote a price and offer service between A and C (through B)-a passenger would fly on a Continental flight between A and B and connect to the code-shared flight (that is, the America West-operated flight) for the B-to-C leg of the trip. If the Continental A-to-B flight were code shared with America West, America West could offer one-stop service between A and C. Finally, if both flights were code shared, both Continental and America West could offer one-stop service between A and C.
Absent the code-share agreement, a travel agent could use an "interline" itinerary to sell a passenger a Continental ticket from A to B and an America West ticket from B to C; a code-share agreement allows a travel agent to offer a Continental (or America West) "online" connection. That is, the onestop code-share flight has many of the characteristics of "single-carrier" service (for example, in terms of frequent-flyer miles and assurance to consumers of coordinated baggage handling). Online connections typically are listed before interline itineraries by CRSs, and research shows that consumers prefer online to interline connections.
6 Also, because online fares for a onestop itinerary typically are lower than the sum of fares on the two flights that make up an interline flight, online fares typically are lower than interline fares.
Code-share agreements also may allow a carrier to offer more frequent service between two cities. For example, suppose that Continental has three flights per day between cities A and B but only one flight per day from B to C. Thus, Continental could offer only one flight per day from A to C (through B). If America West has two flights per day between B and C, and those flights are code shared with Continental, Continental may be able to offer up to three flights per day from A to C (depending on how the A-to-B and B-to-C flights are coordinated).
The financial arrangements between an operating carrier and its alliance partner can take different forms. In some alliances, the operating carrier determines seat availability and restrictions (for example, 14-day advance pur-chase) and the marketing carrier sets prices for its service.
7 This type of alliance is referred to as a "free sale" arrangement. Both the Continental/ America West (CO/HP) and Northwest/Alaska (NW/AS) alliances were of this type. There is no fixed limit on how many seats the marketing carrier can sell of each type of seat. In these types of arrangements, the operating carrier keeps all revenue from seats sold by the marketing carrier. For example, in a two-leg flight, such as A to B to C, where the first leg is operated by Continental and the second leg is operated by America West and code shared with Continental, the total "through" fare from A to C would be prorated between the two carriers on the basis of a predetermined formula. If a passenger bought an A-to-C ticket (through B) from Continental, America West, as the operating carrier on B to C, would receive all revenues allocated to the second leg; Continental would keep the revenue allocated to the Ato-B leg. Although Continental receives no revenue associated with the Bto-C segment, Continental benefits from the code-share agreement to the extent that A-to-C travelers would use a different carrier to travel between A and C if an online connection had not been available through B (for example, passengers could fly A to D to B on a carrier that maintained a hub at D).
The marketing carrier determines the through fare. For example, if Continental sells an A-to-C ticket, it sets the price of that ticket, and America West has no ability to affect that price. If both legs were code shared, two A-to-C flights would be available-a Continental flight (CO on the A-to-B leg; CO* on the B-to-C leg) and an America West flight (HP* on the A-to-B leg; HP on the B-to-C leg). Each carrier would set a price for a trip from A to C independently of its partner.
Alternatively, in a "blocked space" arrangement, the marketing carrier buys a block of seats on each code-share flight from the operating carrier. The marketing carrier attempts to sell those seats at whatever price it chooses and keeps the revenue from those sales. Because the number of seats purchased by the marketing carrier on any particular flight is fixed, either carrier may be sold out on a code-share flight while the other carrier has seats available on the same flight. Thus, for example, if Continental offered service between A and B and purchased 10 seats from an alliance partner pursuant to a blocked-space code-share agreement from B to C, Continental would be able to sell only 10 A-to-C (through B) tickets.
B. Potential Competitive Effects of Airline Alliances
As we have discussed, the announcement of three major domestic airline alliances generated substantial controversy and resulted in congressional ac-tion. However, the likely competitive effects of such domestic alliances have received relatively little attention from economists. Two studies-those of Jan Brueckner and Jong-Hun Park-develop models that analyze the likely effects of international alliances and find that code-sharing agreements may increase or reduce consumer welfare. 8 However, both studies assume that the alliance partners set fares jointly on code-share flights, so the results of these models are not relevant to domestic alliances where joint fare setting typically does not take place. In this section of our paper, we discuss the potential procompetitive and anticompetitive effects of domestic alliances.
Potential Procompetitive Effects
Airline alliances potentially can generate procompetitive effects in a variety of ways. First, as we have discussed, an airline alliance can create additional online carriers between two cities. If one carrier flies between A and B and another flies between B and C, an alliance between the two carriers can create one or two additional competitors between A and C. In addition, the alliance partners may be able to coordinate their schedules so that better connections are created at airport B. Furthermore, when a single firm sets one price for both legs of the trip, any double marginalization issues that arise from pricing A to B and B to C separately disappear so that the through (that is, A to B to C) price should fall. Second, an airline alliance can improve a carrier's service offerings between two cities by allowing the alliance partners to offer more frequent service. In an example we discussed earlier, an alliance between a carrier that flies from A to C (through B) and a partner that flies from B to C allowed the first carrier to offer more frequent A-to-C service.
Third, an alliance may allow the alliance partners to reduce costs in a variety of ways. Some possible ways include the joint use of certain airport facilities, such as lounges, gates, and check-in counters, together with joint advertising and promotion. Such cost reductions could make the alliance carriers more effective competitors. Rev. 181 (1997) .
9 See Brueckner, supra note 8. 10 See Park, supra note 8. An alliance could increase competition by allowing two carriers to market the same seat. In a prior example, both CO and HP could compete to sell the same seat to a passenger flying A to C (through B). That is, a passenger could choose between flying on Continental (CO on the A-to-B leg, and CO* on the B-to-C leg) or on America West (HP* on the A-to-B leg, and HP on the B-to-C leg), even though the two offerings are, in effect, the same seat. However, since airlines choose to become partners, we would not expect them to enter into an alliance whose sole purpose was to increase competition between them.
2.
Potential Anticompetitive Effects Some industry observers have argued that airline alliances can reduce competition. First, concerns have been raised that alliances could reduce competition on code-share routes where the partners already account for a substantial share of passengers by increasing the likelihood of collusive pricing on those routes. For example, the Department of Transportation (DOT) sued to stop the Continental/Delta/Northwest alliance at least in part because "of the much greater overlap between the route systems of these three airlines" than that of prior alliances.
11 The DOT allowed the alliance to go forward only after the three carriers agreed to conditions that would, according to the DOT, "lessen the likelihood of unlawful collusion" (one of these conditions was a limit on the number of flights that could be code shared).
12 A related concern is that an alliance could lead to higher prices by increasing "multimarket" contact between the alliance partners and other carriers. William Evans and Ioannis Kessides 13 argue that an increase in multimarket contact between carriers reduces competition between them.
Second, alliances could harm consumers because of their effect on how flight information is displayed on CRS screens. Code-share flights are listed at least twice on a CRS; if connections are involved, the same flight may be listed three times (once as an online flight for each of the alliance partners and once as an interline flight). Some critics of airline alliances argue that alliances lead to rivals' flights being "crowded out" of the first CRS screen viewed by travel agents. For example, the General Accounting Office (GAO) reports that "[t]ravel agents overwhelmingly tend to book customers on flights listed on the first screen." The GAO claims that "[a]s a result, listings of connecting code-share flights several times limit competition and reduce consumers' choices." 14 In response to such concerns, the European Union since 1993 has limited the display of a code-share flight on a CRS to two entries at most. The DOT, however, does not impose such limits on CRS displays. 15 Continental, Delta, and Northwest agreed to limit each flight flown by the alliance to two CRS entries (as one of the conditions required by the DOT for approval of the alliance). See U.S. Department of Transportation, supra note 11.
Third, an airline alliance could reduce competition that otherwise would have occurred between carriers if the creation of the alliance reduced either partner's incentive to expand its service either between city pairs it already served or to other city pairs. That is, in the absence of the alliance, one or both alliance partners might have increased service by adding capacity. As a result of the alliance, however, that capacity expansion may not be needed since the airline instead relies on its alliance partner's capacity.
The first two potential anticompetitive effects imply that, all else equal, fares would rise on city pairs where code sharing is introduced. As we discuss later in this paper, we find the opposite; that is, our findings imply that to the extent such anticompetitive effects are present, they are smaller than the procompetitive effects associated with the alliances. 16 We do not address the last potential anticompetitive effect of alliances in this study. However, we note that this reason-a reduction in the incentive to expand service-will generally be difficult to evaluate. In effect, a claim about reduced incentives to enter a city pair is a claim about the "actual potential competition" doctrine-a doctrine that U.S. courts have generally not accepted in the absence of some explicit evidence of intent to enter.
III.
The Continental/America West and Northwest/Alaska Alliances
We investigate the competitive effects of the Continental/America West (CO/HP) and Northwest/Alaska (NW/AS) alliances with a series of "beforeand-after" regression studies. That is, we compare changes in average fares and total traffic from a period before the alliance was instituted to a period after the alliance was in place on city pairs affected by an alliance-which we refer to as "alliance pairs"-to the corresponding changes on a set of benchmark city pairs not affected by the alliances-which we refer to as "nonalliance pairs."
Both alliances include an agreement to code-share on specific "segments." A segment differs from a city pair. A segment consists of a nonstop flight between two cities; thus, a one-stop flight consists of two segments. In contrast, a city pair refers to the two cities between which a passenger travels.
17
For passengers flying nonstop between two cities, segments are equivalent 16 The potential anticompetitive "multimarket contact" effect seems strained because it implies that the introduction of a new competitor on a route (for example, A to B to C) is undesirable because it provides an opportunity for a carrier to use that route to discipline a rival elsewhere if competition elsewhere between the carriers becomes more severe. Furthermore, the multimarket-contact hypothesis does not, in general, predict that an alliance would have a differential impact on fares on city pairs that are affected by the alliance compared with other city pairs. Thus, a finding that an alliance leads to lower fares on such city pairs suggests that a multimarket-contact effect on fares is not present. 17 Our analyses are based on city pairs (instead of airport pairs). Thus, we aggregate traffic at different airports in the same city (such as O'Hare and Midway in Chicago).
to city pairs. However, passengers who make connections travel on two (or more) segments, none of which is the same as the city pair between which the passengers fly.
18
As we have discussed, the segment San Diego-Houston is an America West flight that was code shared with Continental. Code sharing between Continental and America West began on several segments on October 1, 1994 (additional code-share segments were added to the CO/HP alliance over the next several months). By May 1995, Continental had placed its code on about 90 America West segments, and America West had placed its code on about 40 Continental segments. 19 The third quarter of 1994-the last quarter before the alliance began-is the "before" period for our analysis of the CO/ HP alliance; the third quarter of 1995-1 year later-is the "after" period.
20
Because the NW/AS alliance was put in place over a longer period than the CO/HP alliance, we use the third quarters of 1994 and 1996 as the before and after periods for our analysis of the NW/AS alliance. Code sharing began on a few segments in the third quarter of 1995; a substantial number of codeshare segments were added to the alliance over the next 2 years. By the third quarter of 1996, Northwest had placed its code on about 45 Alaska segments, and Alaska had placed its code on about 10 Northwest segments.
We identify potential alliance pairs as those city pairs for which the codeshare agreement converts a potential interline flight between Continental and America West (or Northwest and Alaska) into a code-share flight. For example, because Hartford-Houston is a Continental segment, and the segment Houston-San Diego is an America West flight that was code shared with Continental, the route Hartford-Houston-San Diego is a potential code-share route created by the alliance. Thus, San Diego-Hartford is a potential alliance pair for the CO/HP alliance. 21 For the purpose of our analysis, we treat such 18 For example, the itinerary Hartford-Houston-San Diego consists of two segments (Hartford-Houston and Houston-San Diego) that comprise one city pair (Hartford-San Diego). The same city pair can reflect different combinations of segments (for example, the segments Hartford-Chicago and Chicago-San Diego also can be used to fly the city pair Hartford-San Diego).
19 Seven segments were "double coded"-both carriers flew on the segment, and each carrier put its code on its partner's flights. These double-coded segments were flights from a hub of one carrier to a hub of its partner (for example, Las Vegas, an America West hub, to Houston, a Continental hub). 20 Our analysis is based on information compiled by Data Base Products, Inc., which derives its information from the DOT Data Banks 1A and 298C. Both databases are 10 percent samples of all tickets flown during a quarter. Data Bank 1A is based on information provided by major carriers; Data Bank 298C contains information on commuter airlines. We compare third quarters to control for any season-specific effects. 21 For the NW/AS agreement, the ability of Alaska to code share was "turned off" on a small number of selected city pairs. For example, if the alliance generated an online routing from airport A to B to C for Alaska, but Northwest already flew a nonstop from A to C, the routing A to B to C sometimes was "turned off" and could not be offered for sale by Alaska. In such cases, we treat the city pair A to C as a nonalliance pair. Such pairs were identified for us by Northwest. city pairs as alliance pairs if at least one passenger was reported as flying on one of the alliance partners over a code-share route between the two cities in the postalliance period.
22 A substantial number of segments were code shared, so a large number of potential code-share connecting flights were created by the alliance. If A to B to C is an online connection created by the alliance that was flown by at least one passenger, we treat A to C as an alliance pair even if one of the alliance partners offered nonstop or connecting service (through a different airport) between A and C in the prealliance period. That is, we treat A to C as an alliance pair because the alliance created additional service between A and C (it created an alternate online routing between A and C), which may benefit consumers.
The nonalliance pairs included in our analysis are city pairs not affected by the alliance on which one of the alliance partners reported passengers in the pre-or postalliance periods. 24 We first investigate the effect of the alliance on the average fare paid to, and traffic carried by, all carriers on the alliance pairs. We then separately investigate the effect of the alliance on (1) the alliance partners' average fares and traffic and (2) the partners' rivals' average fares and traffic. 25 We investigate the effect of the alliances on both fares and traffic because a carrier's average fare reflects a wide variety of fares. Thus, a decline in average fare on a route need not be associated with an increase in total traffic 22 This screen eliminates itineraries not actually flown by passengers. For example, the city pair San Francisco to Los Angeles would not be treated as an alliance pair even if San FranciscoHonolulu-Los Angeles were a potential code-share routing unless one passenger actually flew San Francisco-Honolulu-Los Angeles on Continental or America West in the postalliance period. Our procedure is conservative in that it may classify as alliance pairs city pairs where the alliance partners did not, in the minds of consumers, offer online service even though one or a few passengers flew that route. Thus, our average measured alliance effect likely reflects results from alliance pairs and (misclassified) nonalliance pairs and so likely understates the true alliance effect. 23 For example, if A to B is code shared, and if B is a hub airport for one of the alliance partners with flights to 50 cities C1 to C50, then the code-share agreement could create up to 50 new online connections-A to B to C1 through A to B to C50. Furthermore, if all possible "double connects" are considered-that is, a three-segment flight such as A to B to C to Dthe number of possible new online connections can be very large. Because traffic on double connects is primarily concentrated through hubs, we limit our analysis of double connects in the CO/HP analysis to only those flights where the middle segment is one of the "doublecoded" segments discussed in footnote 19. For the NW/AS alliance, we assume that all doubleconnect routings include a stop in a Northwest hub (that is, if a flight is A to B to C to D, we limit alliance pairs to flights where B or C is Detroit, Memphis, or Minneapolis). Even for the double-connect alliance pairs we identify, most of these city pairs do not have enough traffic to pass the total traffic screen we use to choose our sample (which we discuss in the next section of this paper).
24 That is, we exclude from our analysis city pairs for which neither partner offered service. However, our results are not substantially different if we include all city pairs in the analysis (that is, if we include in our analysis city pairs on which neither carrier offers service). 25 In some cases, the alliance created new city pairs for the alliance partners-thus, there is no "before" price or output for the alliance partners on these city pairs.
on that route. For example, a decrease in average price may reflect a decline in business fares and an increase in leisure fares. Depending on the relative elasticities of demand for each type of ticket, total traffic could increase or decrease in response to such fare changes.
IV. Findings
In this section, we discuss our findings on (1) the effect of each alliance on average fares and total traffic; (2) the extent to which the alliance effect differs between (a) alliance pairs where the alliance created additional online competitors and (b) alliance pairs where the alliance created additional online service but did not increase the number of online rivals; (3) the extent to which the magnitude of the alliance effect varies with the level of prealliance competition on a city pair; and (4) the extent to which the magnitude of the alliance effect varies with the level of prealliance partners' share on a city pair. Our analysis of the last two issues is limited to the CO/HP alliance because the CO/HP alliance affected a substantially larger number of city pairs than the NW/AS alliance.
A. Base Model
We estimate the effect of each alliance with a series of regression models that are adapted from models previously used in the literature. The dependent variables for our regression models are the percentage changes in fares and traffic from the prealliance period to the postalliance period. That is, the dependent variables in our models are as follows:
1. average fare postalliance /average fare prealliance ) and ln ( 2.
total traffic postalliance /total traffic prealliance ).
26 ln ( We construct three versions of each of these variables: (1) for all carriers, (2) for only the alliance partners, and (3) for only the partners' rivals.
We treat several explanatory variables as exogenous:
Alliance Dummy p a dummy variable that indicates whether the city pair is an alliance pair, 27 26 We also investigate the effect of the alliance on the partners' combined share. In general, we find that the partners' combined share increased on alliance pairs relative to nonalliance pairs by a statistically significant amount. 27 Alliance decisions typically will be motivated by geographic considerations (namely, the ability to extend an airline's network "reach" by entering into an alliance with a partner that provides service in different areas of the country). For example, CO has hubs in Houston, Cleveland, and Newark, while HP has a hub in Phoenix. Thus, the CO/HP alliance was intended to provide CO the opportunity to extend its network into California and HP the opportunity to extend its network to the eastern United States. Therefore, endogeneity with unobservables that affect price or traffic on a particular route likely is not serious. Moreover, we investigated whether fares were falling for the alliance pairs in the year before the alliance and found that they were not, which further indicates that endogeneity is unlikely to be a serious concern. In particular, if we rerun our fare regressions on the same city pairs using the third quarter of the journal of law and economics Change in Percent Round-Trip p the change in the percentage of passengers flying on round-trip tickets, and Entry by Southwest p a dummy variable that indicates entry by Southwest Airlines during the alliance period (defined as one if Southwest's passenger share on a city pair was greater than or equal to 5 percent in the postalliance period and less than 5 percent in the prealliance period; zero otherwise).
Two other explanatory variables-the change in the percentage of passengers flying direct between two cities 28 and the change in concentration on the city pair-likely will be affected by the creation of the alliance. For example, if the alliance creates better connections, the advantage of nonstop flights over one-stop flights on a particular route could be reduced, which would affect the proportion of passengers taking direct flights between two cities. Similarly, if the alliance makes one or both alliance partners more effective competitors on a particular city pair, the alliance partners' share of passengers on that city pair could increase, which would affect measured concentration on that route. Thus, these two variables may capture part of an "alliance effect."
To purge these two explanatory variables of an alliance effect, we measure both variables using information only from nonalliance carriers. For example, suppose that prior to the alliance 100 passengers flew between A and B. Assume that 10 of these passengers flew on one of the alliance carriers and that of the 90 nonalliance passengers, 45 flew on direct flights. Now suppose that in the after period, total traffic increases to 105: the alliance partners have 20 passengers, and 50 of the nonalliance passengers flew on direct flights, so the percentage of nonalliance traffic that flew on direct flights in the postalliance period is 59 percent (that is, 50 out of 85). We define the change in percentage nonalliance direct flights as the difference between the pre-and postalliance percentage nonalliance direct flights adjusted for the nonalliance share of traffic. In this example, the change in percentage nonalliance direct flights is (namely, the prealliance nonal-59% Ϫ 50% # .90 liance share), or about 8 percent.
Similarly, we measure change in concentration (Herfindahl-Hirschman index, or HHI) on a city pair using nonalliance carrier information. 29 Suppose that in the prealliance period, total traffic on a city pair was 100 passengers, 1993 as the before period and the third quarter of 1994 as the after period (instead of 1994 and 1995), we do not find that fares fell on the alliance pairs. That is, we find no evidence that our estimated alliance effect reflects a preexisting relative downward trend in fares for the alliance pairs. We thank a referee for this suggestion.
28 A direct flight is one with no change of plane. Thus, all nonstop flights are direct, and a few connecting flights are direct. The DOT databases do not distinguish between nonstop and direct flights. 29 Change in concentration over time is only a rough measure of the change in competitive conditions on a route for several reasons, including that it ignores changes in total capacity on the route. For example, if the largest carrier on a route expands capacity, measured HHI will increase, but that increase does not indicate a reduction in competition. with 10 being carried by one of the alliance partners and the remaining 90 being split equally between two nonalliance carriers. Then the nonalliance HHI in this period would equal 5,000 (because two carriers each had a 50 percent share of nonalliance passengers). Now suppose that in the postalliance period, total traffic equaled 105 passengers, with the alliance carriers having 20 passengers and the remaining passengers being accounted for by one carrier with 50 passengers and a second carrier with 35 passengers. Finally, because the dependent variables are in first-difference form, our model implicitly controls for time-invariant city pair specific effects, such as the distance between the endpoint cities and the average mix over time of business and tourist travel on the city pair.
33
Summary statistics by alliance status are reported in Table 1 for the CO/ HP analysis and in Table 2 for the NW/AS analysis. 30 Because we adjust for the nonalliance share of traffic using prealliance shares, these variables will not be directly affected by the alliance. Furthermore, our results are not substantially different if we use versions of these variables that are based on all carriers (that is, including the alliance partners). 31 We include the explanatory variables described in the text to evaluate whether their inclusion affects the estimated alliance effects and to be consistent with prior studies. We expect Entry by Southwest and Change in Percent Round-Trip to have negative signs in the fare regressions (nonrefundable fares typically are round-trip only, so an increase in round-trip fares likely reflects an increase in the number of passengers using nonrefundable tickets); we expect Change in City Pair Nonalliance HHI to have a zero or positive coefficient in the fare regressions. The remaining variable, Change in Percent Nonalliance Direct, potentially reflects both cost and quality factors, and thus the expected sign of its coefficient is ambiguous.
32 City pair shares are based on all single-line passengers; that is, we exclude interline traffic from the HHI calculations. 33 Our specification is thus similar to one used by William Evans, Luke Froeb, & Gregory Werden, Endogeneity in the Concentration-Price Relationship: Causes, Consequences and Cures, 41 J. Indus. Econ. 1 (1993), which uses a pooled time-series cross-section approach with fixed effects, the percentage of passengers flying direct, the percentage of passengers flying round-trip, and city pair HHI (all in levels) as regressors. 
Effect of Alliances on Fares
Continental/America West Alliance. For the CO/HP alliance, our analysis is based on city pairs that had total traffic of at least 10 (one-way) passengers per day in both the third quarter of 1994 and the third quarter of 1995.
34
This sample consists of 3,564 city pairs; 707 of these are alliance pairs. 35 We find that fares for the alliance pairs fell substantially and by a statistically significant amount after the alliances were put in place. Table 3 reports the results of our regressions on average fares for the CO/ HP alliance. The first column reports the results of a model that includes only a dummy variable for the alliance. We find that fares for alliance pairs fell 8.2 percent as compared with nonalliance pairs between the third quarters of 1994 and 1995. 36 The second column reports the results of adding three additional explanatory variables-Change in Percent Nonalliance Direct, Change in Percent Round-Trip, and Entry by Southwest.
37 These variables add substantial explanatory power to the regression. For example, we find that fares fell substantially (by about 25 percent) between the third quarters of 1994 and 1995 on those city pairs where Southwest entered. However, adding these variables does not substantially change the estimated effect of the alliance-in this specification, we find that fares on the alliance pairs fell relative to the nonalliance pairs by about 7.1 percent.
The third column of Table 3 adds Change in City Pair Nonalliance HHI as an explanatory variable. We find that Change in City Pair Nonalliance HHI increases fares by about 1.2 percent for every 1,000-point increase in HHI. Again, however, adding this regressor does not substantially change the estimated alliance effect (about Ϫ7.1 percent). 38 34 That is, we include only city pairs that had more than 90 (sample) one-way passengers in both quarters; 91 sample passengers imply 910 total passengers or about 10 one-way passengers per day for a quarter. We also repeated our analysis using different total traffic cutoffs (20 one-way passengers per day and one one-way passenger per day). Our results are not substantially different when we use different total traffic screens. 35 These 3,564 city pairs accounted for about 70 percent of total U.S. domestic traffic in the third quarter of 1995. In principle, the CO/HP alliance could have converted all 3,564 city pairs into alliance pairs by code sharing on enough segments. For example, suppose city A is served by CO, city X is a CO hub, city B is served by HP, and city Y is an HP hub. Then if the segments A to X, X to Y, and Y to B are code shared, A to B will be an alliance pair. As we have discussed, the city pairs on which the alliance is put in place likely will be determined largely by geographic considerations. 36 Unless noted otherwise, all regression coefficient estimates reported in the text are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. Because we find evidence of heteroskedasticity, we report (in the tables) t-statistics that are based on White's method of estimating the appropriate variance-covariance matrix of the estimated coefficients. 37 We also control for the effect of entry by Southwest on our alliance effect estimates by excluding all city pairs on which Southwest entered; excluding those city pairs does not substantially affect our results. .0917
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Source.-Data Base Products, Inc., 12770 Coit Road, Suite 1218, Callas, TX 75251, available at http://www.airlinedata.com; Continental Airlines.
Note-HHI:
Herfindahl-Hirschman index; White-adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses. City pairs with fewer than 10 passengers per day are excluded. Results are based on the third quarters of 1994 and 1995. * Significant at the 5 percent level.
We also repeat our analysis for alliance partners and rivals separately. Because there were many city pairs on which CO/HP had traffic in only 1 of the 2 years (in 1994 but not in 1995 or in 1995 but not in 1994), the alliance partner analysis is based on only 2,655 city pairs; 620 of these were alliance pairs. City pairs where the alliance created CO/HP service are necessarily excluded from this analysis, and so the alliance dummy measures only the effect of the alliance on city pairs where CO and/or HP offered service prior to the alliance (the alliance potentially increased the availability of CO/HP service). Continental/America West average fares fell by about 8.5 percent for alliance pairs relative to nonalliance pairs between the third quarters of 1994 and 1995 (see Table 3 , columns 4-6).
We find that rivals' average fares also fell (by about 6.5 percent) for alliance pairs relative to nonalliance pairs. That is, our results suggest that rivals reacted to the alliance partners' lower fares. However, rivals' average fare reductions (about 6.5 percent) are somewhat smaller than the overall fare reductions (about 7 percent) and the average CO/HP reductions (about 8.5 percent; see Table 3 , columns 7-9).
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Northwest/Alaska Alliance. The NW/AS alliance involves many relatively low-traffic city pairs because many of the segments served by Alaska have an Alaskan airport as one endpoint. For this reason, using a relatively high traffic level cutoff will eliminate from our analysis many of the city pairs that are affected by the NW/AS alliance. We thus base our analysis of the NW/AS alliance on a lower traffic cutoff level-we use a cutoff of at least five (one-way) passengers per day in both the third quarter of 1994 and the third quarter of 1996. For example, the alliance pairs Fairbanks-Kansas City (connecting through, for example, Seattle and Minneapolis) and JuneauMinneapolis (connecting through Seattle) pass a five-passenger screen but would be excluded using a 10-passenger cutoff. This sample consists of 5,879 city pairs, of which only 178 are alliance pairs. 40 We find that fares on the NW/AS alliance pairs fell substantially between the third quarters of 1994 and 1996 compared with the change in fares on nonalliance pairs during the same period. Table 4 reports the results of our regressions on average fares for the NW/AS alliance. On the basis of a model that includes only a dummy variable for the alliance, fares for alliance pairs 1994), although we find that using WLS does not eliminate the heteroskedasticity. The WLS and ordinary least squares results are similar-in particular, the value of the alliance effect in the WLS versions was between Ϫ6.6 and Ϫ7.4 percent. 39 The three sets of results are not strictly comparable because the three sets of regressions are not based on the same sample of city pairs (that is, the rivals' fare regressions are based on fewer city pairs because a few city pairs were served only by the alliance partners in either 1994 or 1995). However, our results are not substantially different if we limit our analysis to the city pairs available for all three analyses. 40 These 5,879 city pairs accounted for about 70 percent of total U.S. domestic traffic in the third quarter of 1996. Results are based on the third quarters of 1994 and 1996. * Significant at the 5 percent level.
fell 5.1 percent compared with fares for nonalliance pairs between the third quarters of 1994 and 1996 (see column 1 of Table 4 ). The second column reports the results of adding Change in Percent Nonalliance Direct, Change in Percent Round-Trip, and Entry by Southwest. As in our CO/HP analysis, these variables add substantial explanatory power to the regression. For example, Entry by Southwest in this sample is associated with a decline in fares of about 35 percent. Adding these variables has little effect on the estimated effect of the alliance-in this specification, we find fares for the alliance pairs fell relative to those for the nonalliance pairs by about 6.1 percent.
The third column of Table 4 adds Change in City Pair Nonalliance HHI as an explanatory variable. For the NW/AS analysis, we find that a 1,000-point increase in this variable is associated with an increase in average fares of about .5 percent. Adding this regressor again does not substantially change the estimated alliance effect on fares (about -6.2 percent).
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The alliance effect on the alliance partners' average fare is negative but statistically insignificant (ranging in size from Ϫ.9 to Ϫ1.9 percent; see Table  4 , columns 4-6). The alliance effect for rivals' average fares is positive and statistically insignificant (from 3.1 to 3.5 percent; see Table 4 , columns 7-9). The differences between the alliance effect on overall, alliance partners', and rivals' average fares are due in part to changes in share from rivals to alliance partners-the alliance partners' average fares were roughly 30 percent lower than their rivals in 1996, so a shift from rivals to the alliance partners results in average lower overall fares even if no carrier changed fares as a result of the alliance.
Effect of Alliances on Traffic
Continental/America West Alliance. We find that the CO/HP alliance was associated with a statistically significant increase in traffic on alliance pairs. We use the same three regression specifications as reported in the previous section, substituting the change in traffic for the change in average fare as the dependent variable (see Table 5 ). The first column shows that the alliance-dummy-only model implies an alliance effect of 7.2 percent. Adding additional regressors (columns 2 and 3) reduces the estimated effect, but it remains substantial and statistically significant (about 6.5 percent).
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The alliance effect on traffic is much larger for the alliance partners than for their rivals. For the alliance partners, traffic increased by roughly 35 percent (on the basis of city pairs where service was available in 1994 and 1995); rivals' traffic increased by about 3.5 percent; see Table 5 , columns 
(8) as measured by the city pair HHI. 46 We find that the CO/HP alliance had a relatively smaller effect on city pairs that already had a large number of competitors or were served primarily by only one carrier; the alliance had a relatively larger effect on city pairs that were served by (roughly) the equivalent of two equal-sized competitors prior to the alliance. 47 For example, our results imply that the alliance lowered average fares by 8-9 percent (depending on specification) on a route where two equal-sized firms competed in the prealliance period but by only about 3-4 percent on a route where five equal-sized firms competed in the prealliance period. (For the 707 CO/ HP alliance pairs in our analysis, the fifth, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 95th per- 46 We also find that the change in fares on nonalliance pairs depends nonlinearly on the prealliance level of competition. In particular, we find that fares rose most rapidly on nonalliance pairs with HHIs of around 5,000.
47 Our findings are consistent with the existence of an S-curve relationship between price and the level of competition. See, for example, Dennis Carlton & Jeffrey Perloff, Modern Industrial Organization 258 (2000) . centiles of the distribution of prealliance city pair HHIs are 1,834, 2,453, 3,349, 4,569, and 7,150.) Table 8 presents our results for traffic regressions. Our results imply that the alliance increased traffic by about 11-14 percent (depending on specification) on a route where two equal-sized firms competed in the prealliance period but by only about 7-8 percent on a route where five equal-sized firms competed in the prealliance period. However, this estimated effect is not statistically significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level (the coefficients on the two alliance dummy interaction variables are not statistically significant at this level individually or jointly).
Alliance Effect by Level of Alliance Partners' Prealliance Share
We investigate whether the alliance effect varies with partners' prealliance share on a city pair and find little evidence of such an effect. In particular, we replace the Alliance dummy with the following five dummy variables: p the alliance dummy times a dummy that takes on Alliance # Zero Share the value one if partners' prealliance share equals zero, p the alliance dummy times a dummy that takes Alliance # LE 10 Share on the value one if partners' prealliance share is greater than zero and less than or equal to 10 percent, p the alliance dummy times a dummy that takes Alliance # 10-25 Share on the value one if partners' prealliance share is greater than 10 percent and less than or equal to 25 percent, p the alliance dummy times a dummy that takes Alliance # 25-50 Share on the value one if partners' prealliance share is greater than 25 percent and less than or equal to 50 percent, and p the alliance dummy times a dummy that takes Alliance # GT 50 Share on the value one if partners' prealliance share is greater than 50 percent.
For each specification, the alliance effect on average fares is of similar magnitude at each level of prealliance partners' share (ranging between 7.6 and 9.4 percent). The alliance effect on traffic also is of similar magnitude at each level of prealliance partners' share except at the highest level-when the prealliance partners' share is more than 50 percent, the traffic effect is of much smaller magnitude and statistically insignificant (between 6.0 and 8.3 percent when prealliance partners' share is less than 50 percent and only about 1.5 percent otherwise).
New Service versus Additional Service
As we have discussed, a code-sharing alliance can create new online competitors on a city pair (for example, if one partner flies A to B and the other flies B to C, the alliance creates one or two additional online competitors on A to C) or increase the service available from an existing online competitor (for example, if one partner flies A to B three times daily and B to C once daily, and the other partner flies B to C twice daily). We investigate the extent to which the alliance has a different effect when it creates "new service" compared with the case where it creates "additional service" and find some evidence of a differential effect from the NW/AS alliance. We substitute the following two dummy variables for the Alliance dummy:
Alliance-New Pair p a dummy variable that equals one for alliance pairs if the combined share of the alliance partners is zero in the prealliance period and zero otherwise, and Alliance-Existing Pair p a dummy variable that equals one for alliance pairs if the combined share of the alliance partners is greater than zero in the prealliance period and zero otherwise.
For the CO/HP alliance, we find that fares fell by roughly the same amount on both types of alliance pairs (about 7-8 percent). We also find that traffic increased by roughly the same amount on both types of alliance pairs (about 6-7 percent). F-tests fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on the two alliance dummies are the same in each of the fare and traffic regressions.
For the NW/AS alliance, the estimated alliance effect on average fares is roughly twice as large on new pairs (10.6-13.9 percent) as on existing pairs (4.9-5.8 percent); however, the NW/AS alliance created only seven new pairs, and so the new pair effect is not estimated precisely. For existing pairs, the estimated alliance effect on traffic is near zero and statistically insignificant; for new pairs, however, the traffic effect is large (13.9-18.9 percent) and statistically significant at the 10 percent level for the third specification.
V. Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate empirically the effect of two domestic airline alliances. We find that both alliances benefited consumers-average fares fell by about 5-7 percent after the creation of the alliances on those city pairs that were affected by the alliances; we find that total traffic increased about 6 percent after the creation of at least one of the alliances. We also find that the average fare and traffic effects arise in part because the alliance partners' rivals respond to competition from an alliance. Finally, we find that the size of the alliance effect on average fares depends on the prealliance level of competition on a city pair, with the effect being larger on those city pairs where the level of competition was initially relatively low. Our empirical findings provide strong support for the view that domestic airline alliances can benefit consumers.
